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If your employment handbook or contract seeks to reduce the statute of 
limitations for claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), that clause will not be enforced in 
the Sixth Circuit.1 After holding that the statute of limitations for claims under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 may not be waived in a 2019 case,2 the 
Sixth Circuit extended their restriction “with equal force” to timeliness waivers 
under the ADA and ADEA.3 Thompson v. Fresh Products prohibited such 
waivers because both statutes’ timing procedures are also considered 
substantive law.4 In the larger environment of increasingly comprehensive 
employment contracts,5 these substantive versus procedural designations and 
the rationale behind them contribute to answering the larger question of what 
claims, rights, and privileges can be waived by preemptive agreement in the 
employment context. 
The Sixth Circuit has twice chosen to distinguish three topics for discussion 
to determine whether the statute of limitations may be reduced for specific 
claims.6 First, is the big picture regarding “the usual process and time limitations 
for filing a charge and bringing a suit” under the statute at issue.7 Next, is the 
significance of a “self-contained limitations period” within the statute because 
it makes the limitation substantive law.8 Finally, the Sixth Circuit “distinguished 
cases holding that contractual limitation periods were valid,”9 ensuring this new 
piece fit into the larger puzzle of enforceable pre-dispute agreements. By 
repeatedly addressing this issue in compartmentalized discussions the Sixth 
Circuit has tacitly suggested that there are multiple paths to recognize 
substantive law.  
 
   Ryland Anatole Doerr is a J.D. candidate at The Ohio State University Moritz 
College of Law and writes for THE OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL Sixth Circuit Review.  
 1 See Thompson v. Fresh Products, LLC, No. 20-3060, 2021 WL 139685, at *11–12 
(6th Cir. Jan. 15, 2021). 
 2 Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 831 (6th Cir. 2019). 
 3 Thompson, 2021 WL 139685, at *10.  
 4 Id. at 12. 
 5 See Rachel Arnow-Richman, Cubewrap Contracts: The Rise of Delayed Term, 
Standard Form Employment Agreements, 49 Ariz. L. Rev. 637, 639–41 (2007). 
 6 See Thompson, 2021 WL 139685, at *9–10 (citing Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit 
Casino, 939 F.3d 824 (6th Cir. 2019)). 
 7 Id. at *9. 
 8 Id. at *10. 
 9 Id. 
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Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims all begin by filing a charge with the 
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC).10 This common starting 
point is crucial because Congress designated “‘(c)ooperation and voluntary 
compliance . . . as the preferred means for achieving’ the goal of equality of 
employment opportunities.”11 Importantly, cooperation and voluntary 
compliance with the EEOC takes time.12 In the case of Fresh Product’s 
“Handbook Acknowledgement,” employees were required to bind themselves 
to a six-month statute of limitations to bring “any claim or lawsuit arising out of 
[an individual’s] employment with Fresh Products.”13 Thus, an employee would 
be effectively forced to choose between following the statutorily prescribed 
cooperative process involving the EEOC or rush to file a claim before the 
shortened statute of limitations expires. This Hobson’s choice could “be 
prospectively detrimental to [a claimant’s] substantive rights under federal law 
and would frustrate the uniform application of Title VII,”14 and by extension, 
the application of the ADA and ADEA.15 
The second topic is treated as an outgrowth from the first,16 but appears 
independently dispositive. Citing the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit reiterated 
“that where statutes that create rights and remedies contain their own limitation 
periods, the limitation period should be treated as a substantive right.”17 Title 
VII has this type of self-contained limitation period.18 As does the ADEA.19 
And “[t]he ADA expressly incorporates Title VII’s procedures, limitations 
period, and remedies.”20 The Sixth Circuit’s decision to briefly make this point 
after walking through the “procedural mechanisms” that would be incompatible 
with a reduced limitation period is noteworthy.21  
Finally, the Sixth Circuit emphasized how the application of the previous 
two considerations in Title VII, ADA, and ADEA claims are distinguishable 
from other claims where the statute of limitations may be altered by contract.22 
The absence of “a self-contained limitation period or an extensive procedure for 
bringing suit” cleared the way to contractually set the limitation period for 
 
 10 Id. at *11. 
 11 Occidental Life Ins. Co. of Cal. v. E.E.O.C., 432 U.S. 355, 367–68 (1977). 
 12 Depending on the jurisdiction, claimants have either 180 or 300 days to file a charge 
with the EEOC. Next, the EEOC is entitled to 180 days of exclusive jurisdiction before 
putting the claimant back on the clock with a 90-day window to file suit after receiving a 
right-to-sue letter. Thompson, 2021 WL 139685, at *11. 
 13 Id. at *3. 
 14 Logan, 939 F.3d at 833. 
 15 See Thompson, 2021 WL 139685, at *10. 
 16 See id. at *11. 
 17 Logan, 939 F.3d at 833 (citing Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 454 (1904)). 
 18 See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e). 
 19 See 29 U.S.C. § 626(d). 
 20 Thompson, 2021 WL 139685, at *10 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a)). 
 21 See id. at *10–11. 
 22 See id. at *10. 
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claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981.23 Similarly, the Employment Retirement 
Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA) does not contain explicit limitation 
periods creating substantive rights that would limit the ability of employers and 
employees to contractually alter them.24 Thus, a recursive pattern emerges in 
the application of the Sixth Circuit’s considerations for determining whether the 
statute of limitations may be reduced for specific claims. 
However, in connecting this holding to the larger debate over the 
enforceability of a range of pre-dispute agreements, and arbitration agreements 
in particular, both sides may claim a victory. Employees can focus on the Sixth 
Circuit’s policy discussion to highlight its willingness to see timing 
specifications as policy decisions that preserve cooperative and voluntary 
resolutions of claims. Conversely, employers can argue that unless a statute 
adopts explicit timing rules, pre-dispute agreements are free to modify the 
statute of limitations for future claims.25 
For employees, this holding is just a small piece of the larger policy 
argument against pre-dispute agreements and mandatory arbitration in 
particular.26 Having the Sixth Circuit uphold substantive rights created under 
federal statutes is not a surprising victory,27 but a win is a win. Employees can 
seize upon the structure of this opinion to argue that substantive rights can be 
inferred from the “procedural mechanisms” embedded in statutes.28 
Additionally, the favorable treatment of specific language in the ADEA 
establishing that “[a] waiver may not be ‘knowing and voluntary’ if it includes 
waiver of ‘rights or claims that may arise after the date the waiver is 
executed,’”29 should be noted by labor lobbyists. Little victories like this are 
probably the best employees can hope for without legislative action. 
Employers on the other hand, did not lose ground but instead have one more 
precedent suggesting that substantive rights are the only true limitation to pre-
dispute agreements in the employment context.30 This view stresses that 
substantive rights must be found in the text of the statute and would dismiss the 
Sixth Circuit’s other considerations as surplusage.31 To bolster this assertion, 
employers can point to the Sixth Circuit summarily upholding a contractually 
 
 23 Id. (quoting Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(distinguishing Thurman v. DaimlerChrysler, 397 F.3d 352 (6th Cir. 2004))).  
 24 Id. (quoting Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 830 (6th Cir. 2019) 
(distinguishing Heimeshoff v. Hartford Life & Accident Ins. Co., 571 U.S. 99 (2013))). 
 25 See Thompson, 2021 WL 139685, at *12. 
 26 See, e.g., Christine Neylon O’Brien, Will the Supreme Court Agree with the NLRB 
That Pre-Dispute Employment Arbitration Provisions Containing Class and Collective 
Action Waivers in Both Judicial and Arbitral Forums Violate the National Labor Relations 
Act – Whether There Is an Opt-Out or Not?, 19 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 515 (2017). 
 27 See Thompson, 2021 WL 139685, at *12. 
 28 See id. at *9–12. 
 29 Id. at *12. 
 30 See id. 
 31 See id. at *8–12; Logan v. MGM Grand Detroit Casino, 939 F.3d 824, 827–34 (6th 
Cir. 2019).  
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reduced statute of limitation for a state law claim without a self-contained statute 
of limitations because “federal courts have upheld contractual limitations 
periods on employment-discrimination claims brought under Ohio law, and we 
find no reason not to do so here.”32 Thus, the biggest takeaway for employers is 
to continue to reduce the statute of limitations for claims arising from 
employment but realize that when a statute explicitly includes a statute of 
limitations, it is part of the substantive law and cannot be altered. 
On balance, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion in Thompson is unlikely to 
significantly move the needle in the debate over pre-dispute agreements in the 
employment context. Nevertheless, it is unusual for this type of dispute to be 
litigated all the way to a circuit court, so the Sixth Circuit’s foray into this debate 
is noteworthy. Especially, as the balance of power shifts in the federal 
government and legislative action on this issue may be reinvigorated.33 
 
 32 Thompson, 2021 WL 139685, at *12–13 (citing Terry v. Cent. Trans., Inc., No 1:09 
CV 2432, 2011 WL 3296852, at *5 (N.D. Ohio July 29, 2011)). 
 33 See Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019). 
